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A Good Enough Reason: 
Addiction, Agency and Criminal Responsibility 
The intent of this FOA [Funding Opportunity Announcement] is to advance 
research on basic processes and mechanisms of self-regulation, capitalizing on 
recent advances in methods and theory from the psychological (social, 
personality, developmental), economic, neuroscience, sociocultural, and other 
behavioral and social science literatures. The current lack of consistency and 
conceptual integration in how self-regulation is studied across a range of 
disciplines hinders our understanding of the basic mechanisms underlying many 
important health and developmental outcomes. National Institutes of Health 
(N.I.H.), 2010 
 
Introduction: A Moral Fable from Real Life 
Let us begin with the case of a real addict, Mr. Leroy Powell, whose 
criminal responsibility was addressed by the Supreme Court in, Powell v. Texas 
(1968; all citations are from the case).  Although it uses outdated language, the 
description of Powell’s condition is consistent with how his clinical problem 
would be described today.  In December of 1966, Powell was arrested, charged 
and convicted of public intoxication.  His defense counsel had argued that 
because Mr. Powell was afflicted with "the disease of chronic alcoholism,...his 
appearance in public [while drunk] was not of his own volition," (p. 517)  and 
thus to punish Mr. Powell for this symptomatic behavior would be a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.  The 
Supreme Court  held that Powell’s conviction and punishment were not 
constitutionally improper and that there was no constitutional requirement of a 
compulsion defense to crime.  For our purposes, however, the evidence in the case 
will set the stage for the argument of this chapter. 
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 Mr. Powell's defense was supported by the testimony of an expert 
psychiatrist, Dr. David Wade, who testified that, 
a "chronic alcoholic" is an "involuntary drinker," who is "powerless not to 
drink," and who "loses his self-control over his drinking" (p. 518) 
Based on his examination of Mr. Powell, Dr. Wade concluded that Powell was, 
a "chronic alcoholic," who "by the time he has reached [the state of 
intoxication...is not able to control his behavior, and...has reached this 
point because he has an uncontrollable compulsion to drink (p. 518). 
Dr. Wade also opined that Powell lacked "the willpower to resist the constant 
excessive consumption of alcohol."  The doctor admitted that Powell's first drink 
when sober was a "voluntary exercise of will," but qualified this answer by 
claiming that alcoholics have a compulsion that is a "very strong influence, an 
exceedingly strong influence," that clouds their judgment.  Finally, Dr. Wade 
suggested that jailing Powell without treatment would fail to discourage Powell's 
consumption of alcohol and related problems.  One could not find a more clear 
expression of the medicalized, disease concept of addiction to ethanol. 
 Powell himself testified about his undisputed chronic alcoholism.  He also 
testified that he could not stop drinking.  Powell's cross-examination concerning 
the events of the day of his trial is worth quoting in full. 
Q: You took that one [drink] at eight o'clock [a.m.] because you wanted to 
drink? 
A: Yes, sir. 
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Q: And you knew that if you drank it, you could keep on drinking and get 
drunk? 
A: Well, I was supposed to be here on trial, and I didn't take but that one 
drink. 
Q: You knew you had to be here this afternoon, but this morning you took 
one drink and then you knew that you couldn't afford to drink any more 
and come to court; is that right? 
A: Yes, sir, that's right. 
Q: Because you knew what you would do if you kept drinking, that you 
would finally pass out or be picked up? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And you didn't want that to happen to you today? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Not today? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: So you only had one drink today? 
A: Yes, sir (pp. 519-520). 
On redirect examination, Powell's attorney elicited further explanation. 
Q: Leroy, isn't the real reason why you just had one drink today because 
you just had enough money to buy one drink? 
A: Well, that was just give to me. 
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Q: In other words, you didn't have any money with which you could buy 
drinks yourself? 
A: No, sir, that was give to me. 
Q: And that's really what controlled the amount you drank this morning, 
isn't it? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Leroy, when you start drinking, do you have any control over how 
many drinks you can take? 
 A: No, sir (p. 520). 
 Powell wanted to drink and had that first drink, but despite that last 
answer, his compulsion did not cause him to engage in the myriad lawful and 
unlawful means he might easily have used to obtain more alcohol if his craving 
was desperately compulsive.   
 Addicts are not automatons.  Even if they suffer from a chronic and 
relapsing brain disease, as one dominant model of addiction claims, if addicts 
have good enough reason not to seek and use, they don't.  The questions are 
whether those reasons are available to them when they seek and use drugs or 
whether they are compelled to seek and use, even if they recognize and endorse 
the reasons not to. 
Powell’s case illustrates the issues this article will consider.  What is 
addiction?  What are the criteria for criminal responsibility, including the criteria 
for compulsion?  Must the law adopt a medicalized view of addiction?  Only after 
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answering those questions can we finally turn to the ultimate question of how 
and in what cases addiction affects criminal responsibility. 
 The analysis begins by contrasting medical and moral views of addiction 
and how such views influence responsibility and policy analysis. It suggests that 
since addiction always involves action and action can always be morally 
evaluated, we must independently decide whether addicts do not meet 
responsibility criteria rather than begging the question and deciding by the 
alternative labels of “disease” or “moral weakness.”  The article then turns to the 
criteria for legal responsibility in general and for criminal responsibility in 
particular.  This section shows that the criteria for criminal responsibility, like the 
criteria for addiction, are all folk psychological, involving acts and mental states, 
and therefore any scientific information about addiction must be “translated” into 
the law’s folk psychological criteria.  Distractions about responsibility are then 
quickly canvassed.  
With the criteria for responsibility in place, the article then turns to the 
direct relation between addiction and criminal responsibility.  It argues that most 
addicts retain sufficient rational and control capacities at the relevant times to be 
held responsible, especially for crimes that are not part of the definition of 
addiction itself.   The article next addresses whether there is good reason to 
excuse or mitigate addicts for the crimes of purchase and possession for personal 
use.   It concludes by briefly considering what contemporary science can 
contribute to our understanding of addiction and agency.  
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What Is Addiction? 
There is no consensual definition of “addiction” within any of the specialty 
disciplines that study the condition and there is no definitive biological marker for 
it.  There is broad agreement, however, that persistent and apparently compulsive 
seeking and using drugs are the core phenomena to be explained.  Some would 
include the presence of extremely deleterious consequences, but that appears to be 
a criterion for the requirement that the seeking and using is compulsive.  Many 
experts would also add the subjective experience of “craving,” but this is more 
controversial.  Thus, the definition most people use is behavioral, including 
actions and mental states (Nestler, 2000).  
In short, here is what we know about addictions.  Some people who ingest 
drugs begin persistently to seek and use drugs in a manner that they describe and 
observers infer is compelled and that the seeking and using then almost always 
creates further, often horrendous consequences for the user.  Seeking and using 
often follow substantial planning and are clearly actions.  Some addicts act 
intentionally to stop being addicted.   There is an enormous amount of other 
research about the biological, psychological and environmental variables that 
influence the development, persistence and termination of addiction.  There is 
also a large body of often-conflicting research on how addiction affects 
behavioral patterns, executive function and other cognitive capacities.  In some 
cases addiction seems to dissociate liking from wanting and it is usually marked 
by ambivalence.  Such evidence might prove important in deciding an individual 
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case.   There is great behavioral heterogeneity among addicts, however, and our 
question is broader: Should addiction per se excuse an addict from immoral and 
illegal behavior?  For these purposes, the statements at the beginning of the 
paragraph are the bedrock, uncontroversial observations. 
  Two ways of thinking about this condition dominate legal policy thinking. 
The medical model treats addiction as a chronic and relapsing brain disease 
(Leshner, 1997).  The definitional criteria are just signs and symptoms, akin to the 
signs and symptoms of other medical or psychiatric disorders.  The legal model 
does not deny that addiction may be a disorder, but it nonetheless notes that the 
behavioral criteria indisputably include human action.   
Why does it matter if we conceptualize drug-related problems medically 
as a brain disease, as the usurped or “hijacked” neural mechanisms of reward, or, 
as a result of chosen action that is within the addicts rational control? Why should 
disputes among philosophers of biology and medicine about the boundaries of the 
disease concept, or the law’s model of the person, or the pure moralizing of many 
prevent useful research and policy? Otherwise useful images or models can have 
negative consequences, however, if they exceed their rightful boundaries or if 
they depend on incorrect factual premises.   
Wrong or misleading images in an inapt domain and inattention to facts 
can produce misguided policies.  Understanding the moral and legal responsibility 
of people for becoming addicted and for criminal conduct associated with their 
addictions has unfortunately been hindered by inadequate or superficial 
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understanding of how explanatory models of addiction relate to responsibility. 
Even sophisticated people tend to think that addicts are automatons, puppets 
pulled by the narcotic strings of a biological disease, and that therefore the addict 
is not responsible for actions associated with his addiction. Evidence linking 
addiction to a genetic predisposition or neurological abnormality contributes to 
this type of thinking (Keller, 2005). Conversely, many people think that addiction 
is purely a result of moral weakness and do not understand the psychological 
dilemmas addicts face. For the law’s purposes, however, the metaphors and 
models of addiction often obscure rather than clarify issues of criminal 
responsibility and of social policy. Therefore, let us first delve a bit more deeply 
into the medical and legal views.  (I have explored this issue in Morse, 2009, and 
will be relatively brief in what follows.) 
The Medical Model 
The concepts of illness and disease have powerful associations in our 
culture, most of which are inconsistent with the sufferer’s responsibility for the 
features of the illness. People can be responsible for initially contracting or 
risking contracting diseases. And a person who suffers from many diseases can 
ameliorate the consequences by intentionally adhering to a prescribed medical 
regimen. But most diseases are pure mechanisms and the sufferer cannot 
terminate all the signs and symptoms simply by intentional choice.  
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The dominant image of people with diseases is that they are the victims of 
pathological mechanisms who deserve sympathy and help and do not deserve 
condemnation. 
The brain disease model of addiction borrows heavily from the powerful 
moral and social associations of the concepts of illness and disease.  Supported by 
highly technical anatomical, physiological, and genetic research demonstrating 
that addictions appear to have a biological basis, the brain disease model 
inevitably suggests that the addict is sick. The signs and symptoms of the 
disease—primarily compulsive drug seeking and use—are seemingly the 
mechanistic consequence of genetically-driven pathological brain anatomy and 
physiology over which the addict has no control once prolonged use has caused 
the pathology.  
 There are many problems with the “chronic and relapsing brain disease” 
view.  These include ignoring or insufficiently appreciating the role of set and 
setting in drug use and addiction (Zinberg, 1984), the underappreciated 
spontaneous remission rates for the addictions, and the sample problems for those 
who relapse because this group tends to be co-morbid and thus it is not clear the 
role addiction plays independently in the relapsing(Heyman, 2009).  Perhaps most 
importantly, the vast number of people who cease seeking and using do so not as 
the result of treatment, but as the result of the exercise of agency.  They have a 
good enough reason (Heyman, 2009).  The brain disease model has much 
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scientific support, but it is hardly the ultimate and complete explanation of 
addiction. 
 The concept of compulsion or something like it is crucial to the medical 
model because without it addiction is just a habit like any other.  Despite the 
current biologizing and scientific advances (e.g., Kasanetz et al, 2010), there is 
still no clear understanding of the biology of compulsively and persistently 
seeking and using substances.  An adequate definition of compulsion that applies 
to action rather than to mechanism is needed to explore compelled action’s 
biological basis, but such a definition does not exist.   
 The conclusion that the addict’s behavior is compulsive is usually based 
on two types of evidence.  The first is the person’s subjective self-report that he 
could not control himself.  The second is an inference from the negative 
consequences that flow from persistent seeking and using, especially if the person 
claims that he wishes to stop.  The inference is that the person would not continue 
to set back his own interests so disastrously unless seeking and using were 
compulsive.  The current favored biological theory for addiction is certainly 
consistent with the view that some persistent drug users find it very rewarding to 
continue use, but it does not prove that the behavior is compulsive.   An adequate 
independent definition of compelled action is crucial.  We will return to the 
meaning of compelled action in the section below that relates addiction to 
criminal responsibility. 
The Legal Model 
 
 
11
11
Criminal law presupposes the “folk psychological” view of the person 
and behavior.  This psychological theory causally explains behavior in part by 
mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, willings and plans.   Biological, 
other psychological and sociological variables also play a role, but folk 
psychology considers mental states fundamental to a full explanation of human 
action.  Human behavior cannot be adequately understood if mental state 
causation is completely excluded or eliminated.  Folk psychology presupposes 
that human action will at least be rationalizable by mental state explanations or 
that it will be responsive to reasons, including incentives, under the right 
conditions.   
Brief reflection should indicate that the law’s psychology must be a folk 
psychological theory, a view of the person as a conscious (and potentially self-
conscious) creature who forms and acts on intentions that are the product of the 
person’s other mental states.  We are the sort of creatures that can act for and 
respond to reasons.  The law treats persons generally as intentional creatures and 
not as mechanical forces of nature.   Law is primarily action-guiding (Sher, 2006) 
and could not guide people unless people could use rules as premises in their  
reasoning about how they should act behave.  Otherwise, law would be useless, 
and perhaps incoherent(Shapiro 2000). 
Criminal law’s concept of the person, including the addict, is the antithesis 
of the medical model’s mechanistic concept. Although all honest people will 
admit that biological and environmental variables beyond the person’s rational 
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control can cause an agent to be the type of person who is vulnerable to 
addiction and predisposed to commit crimes or can put the agent in the kind of 
environment that predisposes people to addiction and criminal activity, the law 
ultimately views the criminal wrongdoer as an agent and not simply as a passive 
victim.  In Powell, for example, the Supreme Court held that a defense of 
“compulsion symptomatic of a disease” was not constitutionally required. The 
Court wrote that public drunkenness was behavior, and thus unlike the simple 
status of being addicted, and it refused to hold that criminal blame and 
punishment were constitutionally impermissible under the circumstances.  
Action can always be evaluated morally, even if it is symptomatic of a 
disease state (Morse, 2007a). Most mental and physical diseases—even severe 
disorders—suffered by people who violate the criminal law do not have these 
exculpate  because they do not sufficiently affect rational agency (Morse, 1999). 
Even if addiction is properly characterized as an illness, addicts may nonetheless 
be capable of being guided by good reasons, including the incentives law can 
provide (Satel & Goodwin, 1998). Whether they do have this capacity is a 
question that must be answered rather than begged by use of the disease model 
without further explanation.   
.The Legal Criteria for Criminal Responsibility 
 The criteria for criminal responsibility, like the criteria for addiction, are 
entirely behavioral, including actions and mental states. If an agent acts 
intentionally with a culpable mental state, such as intent to cause a prohibited 
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harm, and the agent has no legally-recognized excuse, such as gross loss of 
rational capacity or control capacity, the agent will be criminally responsible.  Of 
course the person’s mental state is influenced by biological, psychological and 
sociological variables and knowledge of these variables may help determine what 
the person’s mental state was, but the law is ultimately concerned with the person 
as an acting agent who has acted for reasons.  The final explanatory pathway for 
law is always folk psychological.   
Some may think that the capacity for self-control and the absence of 
coercion--are the same, but for purposes of addressing the relation between 
addiction and responsibility, it is helpful to distinguish them.  The capacity for 
self-control, some would say “will power,” is conceived of as a trait possessed by 
the individual that can be influenced by external events, but is nonetheless an 
aspect of the person (Holton, 2009).  In some cases, the capacity for control is 
poor characterologically; in other cases it may be undermined by variables that 
are not the defendant’s fault, such as mental disorder.  The meaning of this 
capacity is fraught.  In contrast, coercion exists if the defendant was 
metaphorically compelled to act by being placed in a “do-it-or-else,” hard-choice 
situation.  Note that in cases of metaphorical compulsion, unlike cases of no 
action, the agent does act intentionally.  
This account of criminal responsibility is most tightly linked to retributive 
justifications of punishment, which hold that punishment is not justified unless the 
offender morally deserves punishment because the offender was at fault and 
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responsible, and that the offender never should be punished more than he 
deserves. It is generally conceded that, with exceptions that need not detain us and 
prove the point, desert is at least a necessary precondition for punishment in 
Anglo-American law. The account is also consistent with consequential 
justifications for punishment, such as general deterrence.  
Dangerous Distractions 
Before we move directly to the relation between addiction and criminal 
responsibility, it is important to identify some false starts and distractions that 
bedevil analysis of criminal responsibility of addicts or any other offenders.  
These are familiar to philosophers and philosophically-sophisticated lawyers, but 
they bear repeating at least cursorily.  The four false and distracting claims that 
are sometimes made about the responsibility of addicts (and others) are: 1) the 
truth of determinism undermines genuine responsibility; 2) causation, and 
especially abnormal causation, of behavior entails that the behavior must be 
excused; and, 3) causation is the equivalent of compulsion. 
The alleged incompatibility of determinism and responsibility has been 
argued for millennia.  There is a genuine metaphysical debate with no resolution  
in sight, but our moral and legal practices do not treat everyone or no one as 
responsible. Determinism does not guide our practices. If one wants to excuse 
addicts because they are genetically and neurally determined or determined for 
any other reason to be addicts or to commit crimes related to their addictions, one 
is committed to negating the possibility of any responsibility. 
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Our criminal responsibility criteria and practices have nothing to do 
with determinism or with the necessity of having so-called “free will” (Morse, 
2007b).  The capacity for libertarian freedom is neither a criterion for any 
criminal law doctrine nor foundational for criminal responsibility.  Criminal 
responsibility involves evaluation of intentional, conscious, and potentially 
rational human action. And almost no one in the debate about determinism and 
free will or responsibility argues that we are not conscious, intentional, potentially 
rational creatures when we act.  Some scientists claim that “conscious will” is an 
illusion, but these arguments are at present conceptually and empirically 
unpersuasive and they certainly have gained no acceptance in the law (Morse, 
2007c).  Our current responsibility concepts and practices use criteria consistent 
with and independent the truth of determinism. 
A related confusion is that once a non-intentional causal explanation has 
been identified for action, the person must be excused. In other words, the claim 
is that causation and responsibility are inconsistent and that causation per se is an 
excusing condition. This is sometimes called the “causal theory of excuse.” In a 
thoroughly physical world, however, this claim is either identical to the 
determinist critique of responsibility and furnishes a foundational critique of all 
responsibility, or it is simply an error. I term this the “fundamental psycholegal 
error” because it is erroneous and incoherent as a description of our actual 
doctrines and practices (Morse, 1994). Non-causation of behavior is not and could 
not be a criterion for responsibility because all behaviors, like all other 
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phenomena, are caused. Abnormal physical variables, such as neurotransmitter 
deficiencies, may cause a genuine excusing condition, such as the lack of rational 
capacity, but then the lack of rational capacity, not causation, is doing the 
excusing work. If causation were an excuse, no one would be responsible for any 
action.  
Third, causation is not the equivalent of lack of self-control capacity or 
compulsion.  All behavior is caused, but only some defendants lack control 
capacity or acted under compulsion.  Moreover, causation is not the equivalent of 
compulsion because lack of self-control and compulsion are normative standards. 
They apply only to some defendants.  If causation were the equivalent of 
compulsion, all defendants would be compelled and no one would be responsible 
for any criminal behavior.  This is clearly not the criminal law’s view. 
Addiction and Responsibility 
The ultimate conclusion of this section is that most addicts should be held 
responsible for most crimes other than simple purchase, possession and use for 
purely personal use.  In general, addiction does not sufficiently undermine either 
cognitive or control capacities to excuse the addict for other crimes and virtually 
all addicts can be held responsible for not taking the steps to prevent them from 
engaging in addiction-related crime.   
Introductory Distinctions 
Roughly speaking, addiction has four associated aspects or phenomena that might 
be objects of responsibility ascription: anatomical states, physiological states, 
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psychological states, and actions (Fingarette & Hasse, 1979). Among these, 
only action is a potentially appropriate object of moral and legal responsibility 
ascription and a justification for criminal punishment; status is neither an object of 
ascription nor a justification for blame and punishment (Robinson v. California, 
1962). For the most part, people are held morally and legally responsible only for 
actions. Anatomical and physiological states may be evaluated as desirable or 
undesirable, but they are entirely or largely the product of mechanistic processes. 
Anatomical, physiological, and psychological states are not intentional human 
actions (albeit some mental states or processes can be produced intentionally). 
People may be responsible for the anatomical, physiological, and psychological 
states associated with addiction if they are responsible for becoming addicted, but 
the criminal law still would not punish those states because they are solely 
statuses. 
The primary behavioral signs of addiction—seeking and using substances 
(Cami & Farre, 2003)—and other criminal behaviors related to the addiction are 
intentional human actions whether or not those actions are signs of a disease. The 
addict has a desire to consume the addictive substance, often described as craving 
or excessive appetite, believes that consuming it will satisfy that craving, and 
therefore forms and acts on the intention to seek and to use. Such explanatory 
practical syllogisms are the mark of all intentional actions. To assume that the 
addict is not responsible for addiction-related behavior just because it has 
biological causes or because the action is the sign of a disease generally commits 
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the fundamental psycholegal error and therefore begs the question of 
responsibility.  The addict must be evaluated as an acting agent, a person who acts 
for reasons, and not simply as a biophysical mechanism.  
Crimes addicts commit may be divided into three classes and the law 
might well treat the responsibility of the addict differently depending on the type 
of crime committed.  The first is behaviors that are criterial for addiction itself, 
such as buying, possessing and using substances.  The relation between addiction 
and criminal conduct is analytic.  The second  is crimes committed in support of 
the addiction or as a non-criterial consequence of addiction, such as theft to obtain 
the money to buy drugs or Powell’s disorderly conduct.   Crimes committed for 
dealers who will provide drugs as payment fall into this category.   Crimes in the 
second category may of course be over-determined, driven not only by the desire 
for drugs but also for the pleasures that criminal behavior provides.  The third 
class is crimes committed by addicts that do not seem driven by addiction, but 
that may or may not be related to an addiction-related milieu or life-style.  The 
relation in such cases is indirect.   For example, addicts who are part of a gang 
may commit crimes to protect turf rather than directly to support their habits. 
Responsibility for Becoming Addicted 
Whether or not an addict is responsible when his actions are motivated in part or 
wholly by his addiction, if the addict is responsible for being in that state, it is 
possible that analysis of responsibility need go no further. 
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Before they reach the age of reason, some children and many early and 
middle adolescents have substantial experience with alcohol, nicotine, and other 
drugs, and a small number of them become problem users. Still, the simplifying 
assumption will be made that virtually all people do not have their first substantial 
experience with potentially addicting substances until they are mid- to late 
adolescents, an age at which there is reasonable evidence that adolescents are in 
general formally cognitively indistinguishable from adults, but are nonetheless on 
average psychosocially less mature and less risk-averse (Morse, 1997; Steinberg 
et al, 2009a;).  There has been criticism of the findings and ecological validity of 
the studies purporting to demonstrate such differences (Fischer, Stein & 
Heikkinen. 2009), but let us assume that they are reasonably valid (Steinberg et al, 
2009b).  Nonetheless, the differences are not so large as to preclude 
responsibility.  For example, mid to late adolescents can be held criminally 
responsible.  In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that 
because adolescents are less responsible than adults, the harshest adult penalties 
cannot be applied to them mandatorily or applied to them at all (Roper v. 
Simmons, 2005; Graham v. Florida, 2010; Miller v. Alabama, 2012).  
Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that adolescents are sufficiently responsible to 
deserve criminal convictions. 
By the age of reason, any competent person knows generally about the 
dangers of addicting substances. Most people who use potentially addicting 
substances do not become addicts, but between 15 and 17 percent do (Deroche-
 
 
20
20
Gamonet et al, 2004). Whether one considers this a high or low risk is a 
normative question. On the other hand, they may overestimate the benefits of drug 
use and underestimate the risks of becoming addicted (Elster, 1999).   Experience 
with and empathy for those already addicted is simply no substitute for genuine 
knowledge. Consequently, perhaps addicts are not fully responsible for their 
addictions because they operate with insufficient information. 
This claim appears plausible, but too strong. There is sufficiently good 
information about the perils of addiction as a result of both observation and 
indirect sources to warrant the conclusion that those who take drugs understand 
the risks sufficiently to be held responsible if addiction ensues. After all, as long 
as people have general normative competence, perfect information is not required 
for responsibility. 
One can deny that any drug use is rational because drug use is immoral 
and choosing immorality is irrational. Claiming that immorality is irrational is 
philosophically controversial, of course, and in this context it suggests a 
moralistic, virtue ethics. Why, precisely, is limited experimentation or more 
general recreational use immoral? (Husak, 1992; Hough, 1994).  Because it feels 
good? Does all such use degrade the moral personality? Perhaps, but, limited 
initial experience rarely hooks anyone—even if the experimental or recreational 
user is a member of an at-risk population and if becoming addicted almost always 
requires prolonged use (Kalivas & Volkow, 2005). 
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The usual response is that the process of addiction is insidious. No 
single instance of use seems to cross a threshold; the process is instead stealthily 
additive, a slippery slope. At some point, however, the addict is hooked without 
realizing it. Because no initial user can predict whether and when he specifically 
will become addicted, it is always irrational to start or to continue.  
There is truth to this response, but the insidiousness of the addiction 
process is well-known generally and proto-addicts are usually aware that they are 
developing a problem before the problem becomes a diagnosable addiction. They 
may, of course, be “in denial” or using other defense mechanisms, but the use of 
defense mechanisms is an imperfect shield at best and is not an excusing 
condition that morality and law will recognize when serious harms occur. 
Excellent insight is not necessary for responsibility. It is difficult to resist the 
conclusions that most and perhaps all users prior to addiction have some 
awareness of the risk of potential addiction and that pre-addictive use is conduct 
for which the user is responsible. Consequently, most addicts are responsible for 
becoming addicted. 
Even if consciously risking or intentionally choosing to become an addict 
is not rational behavior, responsibility for conduct does not require acting for 
good, rational reasons. It is sufficient that the agent retain the general capacity for 
rationality, the capacity to know the facts and to grasp and be guided by the 
relevant reasons that pertain in the situation. Some addicts may lose this capacity 
after becoming addicted, but that is a different issue addressed below. Until 
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addiction occurs and perhaps thereafter there is little reason to believe that 
otherwise responsible agents do not retain this general capacity.  Of course, how 
much rational capacity is necessary for responsibility is a normative matter, but in 
liberal societies the bar is usually set reasonably low to maximize personal liberty. 
Finally, few people are compelled to become addicted. Peer pressure to 
experiment may be common in adolescence and early adulthood, but it seldom 
takes a form that would justify a compulsion excuse. Initial use is almost always 
intentional and in most cases rational. The user tries the substance to please 
friends, for the thrill of experimenting or being on the edge, and for many other 
reasons that do not suggest excusing irrationality. Moreover, almost no one is 
literally forced to become an addict by the involuntary administration of 
substances. In conclusion, most people who become addicts may fairly be held 
responsible to a substantial degree for becoming addicted.  
To the extent that addicts seek to use their addiction as a mitigating or excusing 
circumstance when they are charged with crimes related to the addiction, they 
become vulnerable to the claim that they have caused the condition of their own 
excuse and, therefore, should not be excused. This is a form of strict liability, 
however, and becoming an addict is distinguishable from committing crimes once 
one is addicted. Very few would in fact foresee committing specific crimes, 
although they may be aware that the addicted life poses risks of illness, poverty, 
and criminality. The only crimes one may specifically foresee would be crimes of 
buying, possession, and use in the case of people addicted to illicit substances. For 
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those addicted to arguably the most dangerous drug, ethanol, there may be no 
specific awareness of the risk of future criminality, except, perhaps, driving under 
the influence. In short, even if addicts are mostly responsible for becoming 
addicted and may be aware of the general risks addiction poses, this responsibility 
is different from the responsibility necessary to be culpable for specific crimes. 
Act and Mental State (“Mens Rea”) Requirements for Responsibility 
Once addicted, should addicts be responsible for use and further drug-related 
activity? By definition, addicts—or many of them—experience subjective craving 
and compulsion to seek and use drugs. In some cases, withdrawal also might be 
feared, but most addicts know that the physical symptoms are manageable, and 
for some of the “hardest” drugs, addicts experience no physical withdrawal or any 
withdrawal syndrome (Haney, 2004; Greenfield & Hennessey, 2004).  Does 
addiction negate action or mental state?   
 Addiction and Action 
Biological models and the discovery of biological causes imply that the 
addict’s symptomatic behaviors are solely mechanisms, but this is not true. 
Compulsive states are marked by allegedly overwhelming desires or cravings, but 
whether the cravings are produced by faulty biology, faulty psychology, faulty 
environment, or some combination of the three, a desire is just a desire and its 
satisfaction by seeking and using is human action, even if addicts have special 
difficulty using good judgment to avoid acting on their undesirable desires 
(Holton, 2009). The addict desires, broadly, either the pleasure of intoxication, the 
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avoidance of the pain of withdrawal or inner tension, or both. The addict 
believes that using the substance will satisfy the desire and consequently forms 
the intention to seek and to use the substance. 
To attempt to demonstrate that people suffering from compulsive states 
are similar to mechanisms, the following type of analogy is often used. Imagine 
that a person is hanging by the fingernails from a cliff over a very deep chasm. 
The hapless cliffhanger is strong enough to hold on for a while, but not strong 
enough to save his life by pulling himself up. As time passes and gravity and 
muscle physiology do their work, he inevitably weakens and it becomes harder 
and harder to hang on. Finally it becomes impossible and the cliffhanger falls to 
his death. We are asked to believe that the operation of compulsive desires or 
cravings is like the combined effect of gravity and muscle physiology. At first the 
hapless addict can perhaps resist, but inevitably he weakens and satisfies the 
desire for drugs. 
Brief reflection demonstrates that the analogy is flawed. Unlike action to 
satisfy a desire, the fall is a genuine mechanism. Holding on indefinitely is 
physically impossible and the ultimate failure of strength is not intentional. 
Imagine the following counterexample: A vicious gunslinger trails the addict 
closely and threatens to kill him instantly if he seeks or uses drugs. Assuming that 
the addict wants to live as much as the cliffhanger does, no addict would yield to 
the desire. Conversely, even if the same gunslinger threatened to shoot the 
cliffhanger immediately if he started to fall, he will fall every time. Of course, 
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liberal societies do not force or even permit addicts to employ such a 
self-management technique. Moreover, ascriptions of responsibility would appear 
unfair if such draconan self-management techniques were necessary.  
Nonetheless, the counterexample, like Powell, indicates that the addict’s behavior 
is not a mechanism and is potentially responsive to a sufficiently good reason not 
to yield. 
An addict is not a cliffhanger, so consider some closer analogies, such as a 
powerful, persistent itch or the motor and verbal tics of those suffering from 
Tourette’s Disorder. It can be damnably hard not to scratch an itch, even if it is 
contraindicated. The premonitory buildup of tension that precedes and is relieved 
by tic behavior among those suffering from Tourette’s is usually intense and  
more bothersome than the tics themselves. In these cases, the “pressure” to satisfy 
the desire, to end the discomfort, can be immense. Even so, the agent will be 
reward sensitive or reason responsive to some degree. The gun at the head will 
wsucceed. If people with itches or pre-tic tension satisfy the desire to rid 
themselves of the itch, discomfort, or tension, surely their behavior will be action 
and not mechanism. In some extreme Tourette’s cases tic-ing may be more like a 
reflex than action and responsibility would be blocked because the agent did not 
act.  All other cases involve action. 
 Although the addict’s behavior is not mechanism, perhaps not seeking and 
using is as hard as not scratching an itch or preventing ticing. Is it fair to expect 
the addict to self-regulate successfully in ordinary circumstances that do not 
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permit brute techniques, such as threatening oneself with instant death? Is 
yielding to the desire an appropriate basis for blame and punishment, especially in 
extreme cases? Perhaps, drug-related activity is sufficiently analogous to 
mechanistic movement to qualify for an excuse, but this requires an argument 
rather than an analogy.  If one concludes, as I think one should, that the addict’s 
behavior is clearly action and not mechanism, then one must turn to an excusing 
condition to respond to the addict’s difficulty refraining from criminal conduct. 
Addiction and Mental State 
The law is generally unforgiving if a defendant lacked a required mental 
state as a result of voluntarily getting drunk.  For example, the Supreme Court 
upheld the exclusion of all evidence of intoxication in a case in which the 
defendant was plausibly in a state of alcoholic blackout at the time of killing two 
companions(Montana v. Egelhoff, 1996).  For another example, the influential 
Model Penal Code (American Law Instititute, 1962, §2.08(2)) equates voluntarily 
getting drunk with a defendant’s subjective awareness that his conduct was 
creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk of a prohibited harm, such as the risk 
of death.  These rules are harsh—getting drunk is not itself a crime--and many 
people think that they are unfair, but the usual justification for them is that the 
defendant was responsible for creating his own potential defense of lacking a 
required mental state. 
In most cases, however an intoxicated person, whether or not he is an 
addict, will form the mental state required by the definition of the crime.  There 
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are exceptions, however, especially in some cases in which the defendant 
claims he was not aware of a prohibited risk he was creating. For example, 
extremely drunk drivers may not be aware of the magnitude of the danger he 
creates or a drunk undergraduate may not be consciously aware of the risk that the 
person he is with is not consenting to his sexual advances. Still, this is a minority 
of cases. 
Whether or not addicts were responsible for becoming addicted, they will 
not lack mens rea for their substance-related criminal activity.  Virtually all 
potential addicts are consciously aware of the risk that if addicted they will 
persistently and intentionally seek and use substances. Nevertheless, the previous 
conscious awareness of this risk is distinguishable from forming the intention pre-
addiction to seek and use after becoming addicted. For most addicts, however, 
there will be no mens rea problem when they seek and use. They are not 
automatons and they do form the intent to buy, possess, and use. In most cases of 
serious criminal wrongdoing, the potential addict may be unaware of the risk of 
committing such offenses unless the addict has a history of such wrongdoing. 
Even if this is true, however, there still will be no mens rea problem. An addict 
who burgles, robs, or kills surely forms the intent to do so.  
In the narrow legal sense, most addicts have the true purpose to engage in 
their drug-related conduct. If they deserve mitigation and excuse, it is because 
they are internally coerced or not fully rational, not because they lack the mental 
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state required by the definition of the offense. Let us therefore turn to the 
excusing theories. 
Excusing Theories  
If compulsion and lack of the capacity for rationality are the law’s primary 
excusing conditions, as is standardly claimed (Morse, 2007b), do craving and 
compulsion to use addictive substances or to engage in other addiction-related 
crimes provide a compulsion or rationality excuse?  This section considers the 
two prime candidates for excusing addiction-related actions: the internal coercion 
theory and the lack of rational capacity theory.  It concludes that the latter is 
preferable on conceptual and empirical grounds.  It then suggests that the 
possibility of so-called diachronous responsibility may decisively bar most 
addicts from claiming an excuse to crime on either theory. 
The Internal Coercion/Lack of Control Theory 
Too often we are seduced by medical metaphors that strongly suggest mechanism 
(Morse, 2002). Nevertheless, the disease model and ordinary language—the 
addict allegedly “can’t help using,” or, more bluntly, is “compelled to use” 
suggest that addiction primarily produces a control or “volitional” problem. 
Volition is a vexing foundational problem for philosophy, psychology, and 
law (Behr, 1993). Even if “black box” models of control problems seem to 
explain the phenomena deemed addiction, the law’s concept of the person as a 
conscious, intentional agent implies that such models cannot provide the law with 
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adequate guidance to decide if an excuse is warranted either in general or in 
individual cases. Any model must translate into terms of human agency. 
Consider some alternatives. If one adopts Professor Michael Moore’s 
influential, widely noticed contention that volition is a functional mental state of 
executory intention (Moore, 1993), the problem of volition disappears because 
virtually no addict has a volitional problem. Their wills translate their desires for 
the drug into the necessary action quite effectively. On this account, almost no 
intentional conduct will raise a volitional problem. Moore’s view, like all theories 
of the philosophical foundations of action, is controversial. Some competitors that 
consider volition a species of desire, a view that Moore and others reject 
(Strawson, 1986), may raise volitional problems in the case of addicts (Wallace, 
1999). Unless these alternatives can be reduced to ordinary language concepts that 
apply to agency, however, it will be impossible for legislatures and courts to 
rationally use them to develop legal rules. 
An “internal coercion” model is one possible explanation of a control or 
volitional excuse based on “disorders of desire.” The model employs a moralized, 
commonsense approach that is analogous to the criminal law excuse of duress 
(Wertheimer, 1987), and that requires no implausible, unverifiable empirical 
assumptions about how the mind works. Consequently, the criteria for duress will 
be considered before turning to whether the model can be applied to addictions. 
Duress obtains if the defendant is threatened with the use of deadly force 
or grievous bodily harm against himself or another unless the defendant commits 
 
 
30
30
an equally or more serious crime, and a person of reasonable firmness would 
have been “unable to resist” the threat (American Law Institute, 1962, §2.09). In 
other words, an agent faced with a particularly “hard choice”—commit a crime or 
be killed or grievously injured—is legally excused if the choice is too hard to 
expect the agent to obey the law. The defense is not based on empirical 
assumptions about the subjective capacity of an individual agent to resist threats; 
it is moralized and objective. Using the term “objective” is not meant to suggest 
that the “person of reasonable firmness” criterion has a reality independent of our 
practices. It is meant to be a normative standard that expresses what we all expect 
of each other in our legal and moral culture.  For example, the defense is not 
available to a defendant allegedly subjectively  “unable” to resist if the threats 
were less than death or grievous bodily harm or if a person of reasonable firmness 
would have been able to resist. 
The moralized criterion of the person of reasonable firmness appears to 
risk unfairness. Suppose a person would find it extraordinarily difficult to resist 
threats that a person of reasonable firmness could resist. Criminal penalties would 
be retributively unjust because a person does not deserve punishment for conduct 
that is so difficult for that agent to avoid. Moreover, specific deterrence is 
bootless in such cases. A purely consequential view might justify punishment to 
deter the marginal people, but at the cost of injustice to those who find it 
supremely difficult to resist. Because fault is a necessary condition for blame and 
punishment, denying the defense would be unjust. Those who take this position 
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should argue for a purely subjective view of the duress excuse, which would 
require difficult empirical assessment of each defendant’s capacity to resist. This 
standard would be a nightmare to adjudicate, but worth the effort if it were 
necessary to avoid injustice. 
There is a good argument, however, that the moralized, objective standard 
is not unfair. If a person is threatened with death, for example, the defense of 
duress should be potentially available unless the balance of evils is so negative 
that every person would be expected to resist. In all other cases, the question 
would at least “go to the jury.” Thus, there will be few cases involving 
sufficiently serious threats in which the person incapable of resisting would lose 
the potential defense. The person who genuinely finds resisting extremely 
difficult even when the threats are relatively mild— say, kill or be touched—will 
almost certainly be a person with irrational fears that will qualify for some type of 
irrationality defense. Duress might not obtain, but exculpation will be available on 
other grounds. 
The formulation, “unable to resist,” has the unmistakable implication of 
mechanism. Unless force majeure or genuine mechanism is at work, we virtually 
never know whether the agent is genuinely unable or is simply unwilling to resist, 
and if the latter, how hard it is for the agent to resist. In the present state of 
knowledge, research evidence concerning the characteristics that help people 
maintain control when faced with temptation or experiencing impulses is no more 
than a general guide (Baumeister et al., 1994).  Even if “willpower” is an 
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independent human ability and there apparently are individual differences in 
self-control (Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 2004), no sufficiently valid metric 
and instrumentation can accurately resolve questions about the strength of craving 
and the ability to resist. This was in large part the reason that both the American 
Psychiatric Association and the American Bar Association recommended the 
abolition of the control or volitional test for legal insanity in the wake of the 
ferment concerning the defense of legal insanity following the Hinckley verdict 
(American Bar Association, 1989; American Psychiatric Association, 1982).   If 
strength of craving or of resistance are to be the touchstones, legal decision 
makers will have to act with little scientific guidance and lots of common sense 
(Donovan, 1988; Cooney et al, 2005; Blume et al, 2005).  Moreover, the 
psychological processes that explain lack of control are better understood as 
processes that undermine rationality. 
The analogy often used to demonstrate that craving is like duress is that 
the intense cravings or desires of “compulsive” states are like an “internal” gun to 
the head. The sufferer’s fear of withdrawal and of other dysphoric states is 
allegedly so great that it is analogous to the “do-it-or-else” fear of death or 
grievous bodily injury that is necessary for a duress defense. Yielding to a 
compulsive desire, a craving, is therefore like yielding to a threat of death or 
grievous bodily harm. The argument is that we cannot expect a person of 
reasonable firmness not to yield in the face of such an internally generated hard 
choice. 
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The analogy is attractive, but theoretically and practically problematic. 
First, the analogy suggests no problem with the defender’s will, which operates 
effectively to execute the intention to block or to remove the dysphoria 
(Fingarette & Hasse, 1979). Further, it is entirely rational, at least in the short 
term, to wish to terminate ghastly dysphoria, even if there are competing reasons 
not to, such as criminal sanctions or moral degradation. And it is simply not the 
case that addicts always act to satisfy their cravings because they fear dysphoria. 
Many just yield because it is unpleasant to abstain, not because they substantially 
fear dysphoria. In addition, the phenomenology of the sufferer’s response to 
craving, unlike the phenomenology of the victim threatened by death, is not 
clearly the product of unitary, simple causes. Suppose, for example, that the 
primary motive is the pleasure or that such pleasure is an important, additional 
motive. The possibility of pleasure seems more like an offer than a threat, and 
offers expand rather than contract freedom. The strong desire for pleasure is not a 
hard-choice excusing condition in law or morals. 
Assuming that fear of dysphoria is a sufficient motive and that the analogy 
to the fear of death or grievous bodily harm is initially plausible, two problems 
remain: assessing the strength of the fear and deciding what degree of fear of 
dysphoria is sufficient to excuse what types of conduct. Based on ordinary 
experience and common sense, the criminal law uses threats of death or grievous 
bodily harms as objective indicators of the type of stimulus that would in ordinary 
people create sufficient hard choice to justify an excuse. People subjected to such 
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threats will differ markedly in their subjective fear responses and in their 
desires to live or to remain uninjured, but ordinary, average people will have very 
substantial fear and find the choice to resist very difficult,  even if they do not 
have great subjective fear. 
 We have all experienced dysphoric states, and many have experienced 
intense dysphoria, but dysphoria as a source of present and potential pain is more 
subjective than death or grievous bodily injury. Consequently, assessing the 
average or ordinary intensity of craving or inner tension, including seemingly 
strong states, is simply more difficult than assessing the fear of death or grievous 
bodily injury. Focusing on more objective markers of compulsive states, such as 
physical withdrawal symptoms, will surely help, but fear of such symptoms is 
unlikely to support an excuse. 
Fear of the physical symptoms of withdrawal from most drugs is not likely 
to be as intense as the fear of death or grievous bodily harm because in most cases 
withdrawal is not terribly painful and can be medically managed to reduce the 
discomfort (Kaplan, 1983). Withdrawal from alcohol dependence can be 
extremely severe, but it, too, can be medically managed, and because alcohol is 
freely and inexpensively available for adults, those who fear withdrawal and do 
not want treatment seldom need to commit crimes to obtain alcohol. 
Dysphoric states are undesirable, but does their threat, especially if 
medical management is available, produce a sufficiently hard choice to warrant an 
excuse? The answer to this question is not obvious, but perhaps at the extreme 
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they do.  People suffering from severe depressive disorders, for example, report 
psychological pain that is apparently as great as the reported pain from many 
forms of grievous bodily harm, and some depressed people kill themselves to 
avoid the pain. For another example, some people addicted to alcohol who are 
being treated with a drug that makes them dreadfully sick if they ingest any 
alcohol, including trace amounts, will “drink through” the sickness (Ludwig, 
1988).  
These examples and common sense suggest that fear of or aversion to 
dysphoric states may be very strong.  But is it as strong as the fear of death?  
Assuming that the feared dysphoria of unconsummated cravings can be 
substantial, it will likely seldom be as severe as the fear of death or grievous 
bodily harm. If this is right, and assuming, too, that we could reliably assess the 
fear of dysphoria, few addicts would succeed with a hard-choice excuse. On the 
other hand, if the drug-related activities were solely possession for personal use 
and use itself, then perhaps the justification of necessity should obtain (American 
Law Institute, 1962, §3.02). Even if the harm of such activity is less than the harm 
of dysphoria, however, the law would hold most addicts responsible for becoming 
addicted and thus for placing themselves in the situation that created the need for 
the defense. The law disallows the justification in such cases. Finally, even if 
addicts were not responsible for becoming addicted, all legislatures would today 
resist permitting a justification for possession and use on policy grounds and 
would surely reject an excuse for other, possibly related crimes, such as robbery, 
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to pay for drugs. The disease model is powerful, but the moral failure model is 
resilient. 
In sum, the internal coercion or duress approach uses understandable 
terms and has a moral basis derived from a defense that the criminal law and 
ordinary morality already accept. Nevertheless, currently insurmountable practical 
problems beset attempting to assess the appropriateness of an excuse in individual 
cases. What is more, thinking about excuse in terms of control difficulties will 
invite misleading metaphorical thinking about mechanism and expert testimony 
that is little more than moral judgment wrapped in the white coat of allegedly 
scientific or clinical understanding. The law should not adopt an internal coercion 
excuse. 
The Irrationality Theory 
Irrationality is the most straightforward explanation of why some addicts should 
perhaps be excused, and will excuse any addict who may apparently qualify under 
the internal coercion theory. If the craving sufficiently interferes with the addict’s 
ability to grasp and be guided by reason, then a classic irrationality problem 
arises. Finally, it is simply more practicable to assess rationality than to assess the 
strength of compulsive desires.  
The subjective experience of addicts is diverse, but a modal tale about 
severe addiction may be useful. Despite different historical pathways to addiction, 
descriptions of the subjective experience are broadly of a piece (Donovan, 1988), 
although different descriptors and metaphors are used. The following story is not 
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meant to include all the features of the addictive process; rather, it is an 
approximation of the subjective experience preceding use that may bear on 
responsibility. 
Between episodes of use of the substance, the addict commonly 
experiences a buildup of tension, irritation, anxiety, boredom, depression, or other 
dysphoric states. As time passes since the last use, these dysphoric states typically 
become stronger, more persistent, more intense, and more demanding. In some 
cases, the buildup is described as sheer desire, sheer wanting. As the wanting 
remains unsatisfied, increased dysphoric states or, in some cases, excitement, 
accompany the wanting. For illicit drug addicts, anxiety or fear about obtaining 
the substance often adds to the dysphoria. 
At some point, the addict metaphorically, and in some cases literally, can 
think of nothing but the desire to use the substance. One informant described the 
desire like “a buzzing in my ears that prevents me from focusing.” It is like an 
extreme version of being dehydrated or starved: the addict can ordinarily think of 
nothing except getting and using. It is like the moment just before orgasm during 
an episode of exceptional excitement, but usually without the pleasurable feeling 
of sexual excitement. There is only one tune or story in the addict’s head and 
nothing else drives it out.  
When the addict cannot get the tune out of his head, it is very difficult to 
concentrate the mind on the good reasons not to use, especially because, there is 
seldom a police officer at the elbow or other available “self-management 
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technique” sufficiently powerful to motivate the addict to think clearly about 
drug-related activity. Fundamental components of rationality—the capacities to 
think clearly and self-consciously to evaluate one’s conduct—are compromised. 
The agent may not recognize the various options at all or may not be able 
coherently to weigh and assess those that are recognized. Attention is captured 
and narrowly focused; judgment and motivation may be disconnected (Holton, 
2009).  For moral and legal purposes, however, the precise mechanisms by which 
addiction can compromise rationality are less important than the clear evidence 
that it can do so (Elster, 1999; Kalivas, 2004; Vanderschuren & Everitt, 2004; 
Redish et al, 2008).  On the other hand, the addict’s characteristic ambivalence 
about addiction suggests that addicts recognize that they have good reason to stop, 
at least during lucid or inter-use intervals. 
 The degree to which the general capacity for rationality is compromised 
can vary widely among addicts. The modal tale is told as an extreme case and is 
anyway only an approximation. Still, addiction can compromise rationality and 
therefore can potentially excuse drug-related activity, especially for those most 
severely affected. Thus, the question remains whether the law should consider 
addiction as the basis for a potential irrationality excuse. This is an important 
question for social and legal policy because drugs are a factor in much criminal 
conduct. Possession and use offenses are rampant, and in big cities, over half of 
all people arrested for felonies test positive for addictive substances (Harrison & 
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Beck, 2003).  Many of these are surely addicts. Should they be held 
responsible, and for what crimes? 
Responsibility Despite the Presence of an Excusing Condition at 
the Time of the Crime?
Assume that as a result of addiction, some addicts are sufficiently irrational or are 
so “internally coerced” to warrant mitigation or excuse at the time they commit 
their substance-related crimes. Should they be held responsible nonetheless? Two 
theories suggest in general that virtually all should be. The first is that by 
experimenting with drugs, the addict knowingly took the risk that he would 
become irrational or internally coerced, including the possibility that the excuse 
would operate specifically in contexts involving substance-related behavior. This 
theory comes dangerously close to strict liability in many instances, however, 
because most people who experiment with drugs probably are not consciously 
aware that they might become involved in criminal behavior beyond buying and 
possessing and using drugs.  And even the latter is not a feature for licit addictive 
drugs such as ethanol.  
The second and more convincing theory is that almost all addicts have 
lucid, rational intervals between episodes of use during which they could act on 
the good reasons to seek help quitting or otherwise to take steps to avoid engaging 
in harmful drug-related behavior. This has been termed a case of potential 
diachronic self-control because the person knows that at a later time he will be in 
a state of non-responsibility (Kennett, 2001). Again, the ambivalence about 
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addiction that characterizes addicts implies that they are capable of and do 
recognize these good reasons during their lucid intervals. Even if some addicts are 
unable to think rationally when they are in a state of intense craving, they are 
capable of rationality in refractory periods and have a duty to take steps to avoid 
future offending. Consider the following analogy.  If a person knows that he is 
subject to psychomotor epileptic seizures that cause blackout, then he will be held 
responsible if he blacks out while driving and kills someone.  Although when he 
killed he was in a blacked out state that would otherwise defeat liability, he will 
be guilty of creating a unreasonable risk of death simply by driving with 
knowledge that he might black out.  The question for addicts would be with what 
mental state they commit their crimes while they are not fully rational.  In 
virtually all cases, they would commit their crimes intentionally and the law 
would not provide an excuse for their “culpable” lack of rationality or internal 
coercion.  A sentencing judge might consider this a mitigating factor as a matter 
of discretion.    
Both theories for holding addicts responsible are potentially subject to the 
same objection, however. Addiction can become an entire lifestyle and the 
consequences of prolonged use of substances can so debilitate some addicts 
physically and psychosocially that this group has exceptional difficulty at all 
times exercising rationality concerning their status and behavior. Although 
potential addicts may be aware of the risk of irrationality, they may not be fully 
aware of the risk of extreme irrationality that can arise. In such instances, perhaps, 
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one cannot find responsibility for extreme irrationality by referring back to pre-
addiction, knowing conduct, or by considering quiescent intervals. In cases of 
extreme debilitation, the intervals between episodes of use may not be fully 
rational. 
The foregoing objection does not seem decisive, however. In those few 
cases in which prolonged drug use produces a permanent, major mental disorder 
that compromises rationality at the time of criminal conduct, the addict will have 
available a traditional insanity defense based on “settled insanity” resulting from 
the use of intoxicants (La Fave, 2010).  But except in such rare cases, most 
addicts’ rational intervals are probably sufficiently rational to hold them largely or 
fully responsible for diminishing their own rationality at the time of use or of 
other drug-related crimes. In addition, as a result of both street wisdom and 
personal history, experienced addicts typically know during these intervals both 
what treatment alternatives are available and the type of criminal behavior beyond 
seeking and using in which they are likely to engage. Indeed, much of the further 
criminal activity probably takes place during the rational intervals and involves 
harm to others, which carries greater criminal penalties, giving the addict even 
stronger self—and other—regarding reasons not to offend than in the case of 
personal possession and use. 
Finally, suppose one concludes that some addicts deserve mitigation or 
excuse for at least some criminal conduct. The subsection on the internal coercion 
theory suggests that irrationality would excuse any addict that the internal 
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coercion theory might fairly excuse. The argument, in brief, is this: A person 
driven crazy by fear is crazy. Or, in the alternative, people so fearful of mild 
dysphoric states that they appear incapable of bucking up when reasonable people 
would are irrationally fearful. Any plausible story about allegedly compulsive 
cravings motivating the criminal conduct, especially in cases of serious crime, 
also will be a story in which the addict is less than fully rational or not rational at 
all. In such cases, irrationality would be the appropriate excusing claim; there 
would be no need to resort to problematic internal coercion. 
The conclusion is that most addicts are responsible for seeking and using 
and almost none should be excused for further criminal activity, and especially 
not for serious wrongdoing that is not a direct consequence of the addiction itself. 
There are simply too many periods of rationality and there is simply too much 
awareness of alternative possibilities to permit excuse in more than a small 
number of cases unless, perhaps, the law expanded doctrines of mitigation 
(Morse, 2003).  
Can Science Solve the Moral and Legal Dilemmas Addiction Creates? 
 This section will assume that the radical challenges to agency, such as that 
we are merely “victims of neuronal circumstances” (Greene & Cohen, 2006), will 
not succeed for the foreseeable future.  In the extremely unlikely event they do 
succeed, not only addicts will be recognized as lacking agency; no one will be a 
genuine agent.  For now, however, we can put such dystopian visions aside 
because they are neither conceptually nor empirically justified (Morse, 2011a). 
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 Given current legal doctrine, at present the new neuroscience is seldom 
relevant to legal decisions about criminal responsibility in general (Morse & 
Newsome, 2013) or about addiction and responsibility in particular (Husak & 
Murphy, 2013).  In the near to intermediate future, however, neuroscience, 
behavioral genetics and psychology might teach us a good deal more about the 
human capacity for rationality and self-control or self-regulation and about how 
and under what conditions they are compromised.  If so, we will learn much 
useful information that can guide normative decision-making about agency and 
responsibility.  Once again, however, that knowledge will first have to be 
translated into the folk-psychological criteria of agency and responsibility.  And if 
there is a conflict between a scientific finding and the agent’s actual behavior, 
with the rarest of exceptions, we must believe the behavior.  The criteria for 
agency and responsibility are once again behavior, and actions speak louder than 
images, SNPs, or any psychological test finding.  Finally, whatever scientific 
information we learn will not tell us how much of what capacities is necessary for 
full agency and responsibility.  That is a normative question to which science can 
contribute but cannot determine. 
Conclusion  
All behavior is caused by innumerable variables over which we have no 
control. Some causal stories surely arouse more sympathy than others, but 
sympathy and an unfortunate life history are not excusing conditions per se. One 
may wish to consider such variables for disposition on consequential grounds or 
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as an expression of mercy, but they do not excuse unless they produce 
sufficient irrationality or a sufficiently hard choice. Focusing on individual 
responsibility should not blind us to the remediable causes of wrongdoing and 
should not diminish justifiable sympathy for wrongdoers, but neither should 
explanations and sympathy undermine our view that most wrongdoers are 
responsible agents.  If they have good enough reason, addicts can quit or move to 
controlled use. 
 
Author’s Note:  This article draws on and extends previously published work on 
the same topic (Morse, 2011b).  I thank Ed Greenlee for his invaluable help. 
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